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In this paper, the effects of alternatives to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts on employ-
mentandwagesareexaminedinamodelwithsearchgeneratedequilibriumunemployment.
It is demonstrated that employment improves if a value–added tax is levied, as opposed to
a social system contribution, where employees bear part of the contribution. In addition, it
is shown that shifting the burden of the contribution to the Social Security system from em-
ployers to employees may have negative employment effects if the beneﬁts are not taxed.
This effect vanishes if the beneﬁts are taxed.
JEL–Classiﬁcation: H24, H55, J64.
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1 Introduction
The policymaker confronted by the question how to design or to reform the Social Security
system faces a considerable choice of alternatives. On the one hand, he or she can set different
structures for the expenditures of the Social Security system. Examples are the conditions for
receiving unemployment beneﬁts or the calculation method. On the other hand, the government
has a discretionary choice concerning the revenues. It can levy different taxes, as e.g. a lump–
sum tax, a consumption tax, an income tax, or a proﬁt tax among others. In a closed economic
system, different structures of the expenditures and the revenues may inﬂuence the employment
as well as the wages differently. Consequently, a benevolent policymaker will take these effects
into account.
Clearly, the necessity to decide on the structure of the Social Security system goes hand–in–
hand with the arising of unemployment. Depending on the reason for unemployment, the same
structure of the Social Security system may have other effects on employment and wages. Ac-
cordingly, each investigation of a potential reform of the Social Security system has to present
an answer for the question of what causes unemployment. Various microeconomic explanations
have become popular in the literature. Among them are the theory of efﬁciency wages, union–
ﬁrm wage bargaining, and cost intensive search processes on the labour market. So far, there is
no consensus as to which model best explains unemployment.
Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of papers focusing on the optimal form of the
Social Security system use alternative assumptions referring to the causes of unemployment.
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Thepapersareconcernedwiththerelationbetweeneitherthestructureoftheexpendituresideor
the revenue side and employment. Goerke (1998) e.g. demonstrates that a stronger dependence
of the unemployment compensation on income has positive employment effects in an efﬁciency
wage model. In contrast, Vijlbrief and van de Wijngaert (1995) show that a stronger dependence
of the beneﬁts on income may yield negative employment effects in a monopoly union model.
Papers concentrating on the revenue side of the Social Security system take the expenditure
structure and the reason for unemployment as given. Pissarides (1998) e.g. studies the impact
of employment tax cuts under alternative assumptions on the causes of unemployment. He ﬁnds
that the tax cut has substantial positive effects on the employment level if the compensation is
a ﬁxed payment. He also demonstrates a positive employment effect for reforms strengthening
the tax progression. Goerke (1999) considers the inﬂuence of a shift from a payroll tax to a
consumption tax. Using an efﬁciency wage model, he shows that the reform improves employ-
ment if the rise in the consumption tax leaves the consumer prices unchanged. Pﬂ¨ uger (1997)
analyses the same problem in the union wage bargaining model. He also ascertains a positive
employment effect if beneﬁts are not taxed. On the contrary, Smith (1994) shows that the wage
tax reduces unemployment if the beneﬁts are taxed in a search model.
So far, little has been said about the effects of a Social Security system on employment and
welfare when costly search and matching processes cause equilibrium unemployment. This
is the scope to which the present paper wants to contribute. It compares search generated
unemployment levels and wages under alternative options of ﬁnancing the unemployment com-
pensation. It is assumed that the policymaker has only two excluding alternatives to raise the
revenues necessary to ﬁnance a given structure of the expenditures: imposing an indirect value–
added tax or levying a Social Security compensation. In case the policymaker decides in favour
of a Social Security system, he or she additionally chooses the share of the contribution paid
by the employees. The alternative of raising a lump–sum tax forms the reference point of the
comparison.
It is demonstrated that a shift from a Social Security compensation to a value–added tax
improves employment only if i) the employees pay at least a share of the contribution to the
Social Security system and ii) if the beneﬁts are not taxed. In case the employers pay the
contribution alone, the unemployment rate and the welfare is identical in economies with a
Social Security contribution and a value–added tax. The same result can be derived if the
beneﬁts are taxed.
The paper is organisedas follows. The nextsection introduces the basic model and discusses
the alternatives of ﬁnancing the unemployment beneﬁts. Section 3 considers the wage setting
rules of the alternatives and presents some preliminary results. Section 4 studies the equilibrium
employment effects of the alternatives of ﬁnancing the beneﬁts and draws some policy conclu-
sions. Section 5 focuses on the welfare analysis. Finally, section 6 discusses potential reforms
and the limitations of the model.Pia Weiß 3
2 The economy with search frictions
Suppose, a policymaker has two possibilities of raising the revenues necessary to ﬁnance the
given structure of the Social Security system’s (SSS) expenditures: to levy a value–added tax
(VAT) or to impose a Social Security compensation (SSC). At the same time, he or she observes
that unemployment is caused by costly search and matching processes on the labour market.
The benevolent government knows perfectly well that deciding on one or the other option may
affect the employment level and the wages. Which alternative is chosen by the policymaker if
he or she desires a high level of welfare?
To answer this question, it has to be determined how the VAT or the SSC inﬂuences the
employment level and the wages. Therefore, this section introduces the basic assumptions and
sketches the channels which transmit the individual’s and ﬁrm’s decisions into employment and
wages effects.
2.1 The basic assumptions
The model is based on a simple Mortenson–Pissarides matching model.1 The following
assumptions characterise the model economy.
Individuals: There is a ﬁxed number of risk–neutral individuals (n) with an inﬁnite life span.
They are all alike except for the fact that they may ﬁnd themselves in different employment
positions. They are either employed or unemployed. Let e and u denote the total number of
employed and unemployed persons, it follows that n = e+u.
Firms: Let k be the number of ﬁrms in the economy. Each ﬁrm has exactly one job on offer,
which can be either ﬁlled or not. If v denotes the total number of vacancies available in the
economy, then k = e+v.
Production function: Given that each ﬁrm can employ exactly one worker, an employee–
employer pair produces y units of the homogenous, non–storable consumption good.
Searching: Only unemployed persons and vacant ﬁrms actively search for a new partner.
Whereas the search activity is not associated with direct costs for the job seekers, posting a
vacancy costs a ﬁrm g units per period.
Matching: Let the function m(u;v) describe the market mechanism matching job seekers
and vacant ﬁrms.2 It is assumed that this function is linear homogenous and increasing in the
number of unemployed persons and the number of vacancies. Consequently, m denotes the
number of newly formed employee–employer pairs during a period. From the individual’s and
the ﬁrm’s point of view, matching follows a Poisson process. Let p and q denote the probability
of ﬁnding a new partner for an unemployed person and a ﬁrm with a vacancy respectively. Then,
it is reasonable to specify p = m=u and q = m=v.
Separation: Existing employee–employer pairs are dissolved for exogenous reasons. Ac-
cordingly, each worker–ﬁrm pair faces a constant probability that the labour contract terminates
1 See e.g. Pissarides (1990, ch. 1) or Hosios (1990a,b).
2 See e.g. Burda and Wyplosz (1994), Berman (1997), Blanchard and Diamond (1989) or Pissarides (1986) for
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so that se workers enter the unemployment pool in each period. As a consequence, the evolution
of employment can be described by ˙ e = m(u;v)¡se, where ˙ e = 0 in a steady state.
In order to fully characterise the model economy, the structure of the expenditures and the
revenues as well as their impact on the wages have to be speciﬁed.
2.2 The unemployment compensation
It was assumed that the policymaker has a choice between imposing a VAT or an SSC to
ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts, yet he or she regards the structure of the expenditures as
given. Principally, the unemployment compensation can take the form of a ﬁxed payment, a
ﬁxed replacement ratio, or a combination of both. In addition, each of the three alternatives can
either be speciﬁed in real or nominal terms. As it can be seen in table 1, only Poland frequently
revises the unemployment compensation. All other countries grant nominal beneﬁts.
Table 1 also indicates that the majority of the OECD countries grant unemployment beneﬁts
proportional to the previous earnings. Among those countries, the greater number decided to
base the beneﬁts on the previous gross income.
As the unemployment compensation is the income of an unemployed person, it may be
subject to the normal tax schedule. Indeed, the beneﬁt payments are principally taxable in a
number of OECD countries. However, this regulation does not imply that job seekers actually
pay e.g. income taxes. If part of the income is tax–free the unemployment beneﬁts may be
lower than this limit.
Summarising the evidence given in table 1, it is henceforward assumed that the expenditure
structure is determined by a nominally ﬁxed replacement ratio. Furthermore, no SSC is raised
on the unemployment compensation. Therefore, the nominal unemployment beneﬁts are given
by
b = b0w;
where b0, b0 2 [0;1], and w stand for the nominally ﬁxed replacement ratio and the gross wages
respectively.
2.3 The alternative ﬁnancing options
In the present model, the government pursues only one task — collecting taxes to ﬁnance
the granted unemployment beneﬁts. However, it has a discretionary choice regarding the rev-
enue structure. Naturally, choosing one alternative or the other to ﬁnance the SSS expenditures
changes the individual’s and ﬁrm’s variables. As a consequence, the policymaker’s decision in-
directly inﬂuences the wage determined as the outcome of an individual bargaining process and
thereby the employment level in an economic system. The present work sketches a situation in
which the policymaker only has two options: levying a VAT or imposing an SSC. To establish
a reference point, the alternative of raising a lump–sum tax is integrated into the analysis.
Choosing different alternatives to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts yields other values for
the producer price pp that a ﬁrm receives and the total labour costs wc. Similarly, the consumer
price pc andthedisposableincome ˜ yforbothemployedandunemployedindividualsaredirectly
inﬂuenced by the policymaker’s choice. As a consequence, the employee’s consumption ce, thePia Weiß 5
Country Beneﬁts Ceilings Earnings Taxable
min max gross net yes no
Australia ﬁxed – – – – X
Austria proportional X (X) Xa X
Belgium proportional (X) X Xb;c
Canada proportional (X) X X
Czech Republic proportional X X
Denmark proportional X Xd Xb;c
Finland linear Xe Xf
France gen. linear (X) X¤ Xb
Germany proportional (X) X X
Greece proportional X X X¤ Xb
Hungary proportional X X X Xc
Ireland ﬁxed – – – – Xc
Italy proportional X X Xc
Japan proportional X X X
Korea proportional X X X X
Luxembourg proportional (X) X X X
Netherlands proportional (X) X X
Norway proportional (X) X¤ X
Poland ﬁxedg – – – – X
Portugal proportional X (X) X¤ X
Spain proportional X X X X X
Sweden proportional X X X¤ X
Switzerland proportional (X) X Xc
United Kingdom ﬁxed – – – – X
United States proportional X Xc
Table 1: Unemployment compensation in OECD counties
Source: Organization of Economic Co–operation and Development (2000)
(X): implicit ceiling by restrictions on the earnings; X¤: not explicitly mentioned in the OECD–database
a: after income tax
b: with exceptions
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unemployed person’s cu, and the indirect utility depend on the chosen ﬁnancial option. This
can be seen by ﬁrst noting that the consumption equals the real disposable income ˜ y=pc since
there is only one homogenous good in the economy. As both the disposable income and the
consumer price vary with the choice of the ﬁnancial alternative, the consumption will differ as
well. Secondly, the utility function for the risk–neutral individuals can be transformed without
loss of generality so that the indirect utility function v(y;pc) ensues with
v(¢) = c = ˜ y=pc: (1)
Let us give a short remark on the relation between prices before presenting the ﬁrm’s and the
individual’s variables for the alternative ﬁnancing options. Here, the product price is chosen as
the numeraire. There are two reasons for both the producer and the consumer prices to deviate
from the product price. First, the government may impose a tax on consumption or on revenues.
Second, even in absence of a consumption tax, the consumer price may exceed the product price
if the entrepreneurs pass part of their tax burden onto the consumers. The following analysis
allows for this possibility by introducing s, s 2 [0;1], when the VAT or the SSC is considered.
This variable denotes the extent to which the producer can shift the tax burden forward and is
endogenously determined here.
A lump–sum tax l
If the government chooses a lump–sum tax, the disposable incomes ˜ y of employed and
unemployed individuals are equally affected. All other variables are not directly inﬂuenced.
Speciﬁcally, the consumer and the producer prices are equivalent to the product price, i.e. pc =
pp =1. By equation (1), the consumption and the indirect utility for employed and unemployed






As the production side of the economy is completely unaffected by a lump–sum tax, the total
labour costs wc equal the gross wages w.
The government chooses the tax l so that the total tax revenues ln equal the total unem-
ployment beneﬁts bu, i.e. the government is supposed to run a balanced budget. Consequently,
the government’s budget restriction reads
ln = bu: (3)
A value–added tax c
Suppose now, the government decides in favour of a VAT c, c 2 [0;1). As the labour is
the only input factor, a VAT can be modelled as a tax on revenues. In the ﬁrst place, only the
producer price is affected by the introduction of a VAT. Given that the entrepreneurs pass part
of their tax burden to consumer prices, the latter is indirectly inﬂuenced by a VAT. The after–taxPia Weiß 7
producer price pp reads pp = 1¡(1¡s)c and the consumer price is pc = 1+sc. As it can be






Since VAT is effectively raised on the revenues, the total labour costs wc and the gross wages w
are identical.
Again, a balanced budget requires the tax revenues ecy to cover the expenditures for the
granted unemployment beneﬁts bu, so that the government’s budget constraint can be written as
ecy = bu: (5)
A social security contribution J
If the government favours an unemployment insurance, the insurance receives contributions
in the amount of a constant fraction J, J 2 [0;1], of the gross wages. Employees pay a share r,
r 2 [0;1], of the contribution. The ﬁrm’s share is f = (1¡r). As r can equal one as well as
zero, the analysis also includes the special cases in which either the employee or the employer
alone bears the burden of the contribution. To distinguish both, we refer to the former case
(r = 1) as income tax and to the latter one (r = 0) as payroll tax.
Given this setup, the labour costs wc and the disposable income of the employees is directly
affected by the introduction of an SSC. The ﬁrm’s total labour costs are given by the sum of the
gross wages w and the ﬁrm’s share of the SSC fJw, so that wc = (1+fJ)w. The ﬁrm may shift
part of the contribution to the consumers. Since s is the fraction which the entrepreneur is able
to pass onto consumers, sfJw is the share of the total labour costs the he or she transmits. As
the ﬁrm produces y units of the consumption good, sfJw=y is the amount by which the product
price is increased. Therefore, the consumer and the producer price are pc = pp =(1+sfJw=y).
With an SSC, the disposable incomes of employed and unemployed persons are asymmetri-
cally affected. Whereas job seekers do not pay a contribution to the SSS, workers do. Therefore,
the net wage is (1¡rJ)w, whereas the net beneﬁts are still given by b. The individual’s con-






In absence of alternative revenues to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts, the government’s
budget restriction reads
Jew = bu: (7)
Equation (3), (5), and (7) specify the ﬁnancial restrictions of the government. Given that the
government ﬁxes the replacement ratio b0, these equations determine the tax rate necessary to
run a balanced budget. Equation (2), (4), and (6) specify the indirect utility for the considered
options to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts. These equations are important for studying the
effects of the government’s decision on the wages in the next section.8 How to Finance Unemployment Beneﬁts
3 The wage sharing rule
A matched employer–employee pair has an advantage over the unmatched vacant ﬁrms and
the job seekers: They do not need to continue the cost and time consuming search activity.
Consequently, the matching process generates a surplus to the insiders. Its constitutes the pos-
sibility of wage negotiations. Therefore, the bargaining process between a potential worker and
a ﬁrm determines the wage and thereby the distribution of the common surplus. To characterise
the unique outcome of the bargaining procedure, the asymmetric Nash bargaining approach is
applied.3
The solution reasonably presupposes that the wage negotiation immediately starts when the
potential employee and the employer meet. While negotiating, both partners take into account
that the best outside option is to continue the search process, i.e. the potential worker reenters
the unemployment pool and the ﬁrm once again posts the vacant job. However, the evaluation
of the outside option depends on the probability of ﬁnding another partner. As the matching
procedure between an individual and a ﬁrm follows a Poisson process, p and q denote the rates
at which employers attain job seekers and vice versa. Using the properties of the matching
function, the relation p=q = q, q = v=u, can be obtained. q is also known as the vacancy–
unemployment ratio or the Beveridge ratio and is a measure for the labour market tightness.
The appendix shows that the wage has to satisfy the following sharing rule4
(1¡b)(ce¡cu) = b(ppy¡wc+gq); (8)
where b, b 2 [0;1] is the individual’s bargaining power in the wage negotiation.
The sharing rule (8) is expressed in a general form so that it is valid for a lump–sum tax, a
VAT, or an SSC. Replacing the consumption for employed and unemployed persons ce and cu,
the producer price pp, and the labour costs wc by the speciﬁc values described in the last section
yields the appropriate sharing rules for the alternative ﬁnancing options.
4 The employment effects of alternative ﬁnancing options
In this section, the equilibrium levels of employment are compared for a lump–sum tax,
a VAT, and an SSC. For each ﬁnancial option, the equilibrium can be characterised by two
equations. The ﬁrst is the labour market equilibrium condition and the second one is the risk–
adjusted effective present value of a ﬁlled job. The latter implicitly determines the labour de-
mand and is called this henceforward.5
3 The wage can be the modelled as the outcome of either a sequential bargaining game or an axiomatic Nash bar-
gaining problem. However, Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) show that an asymmetric Nash bargain-
ing process and a sequential bargaining process yield identical steady state results under certain circumstances.
Coles and Wright (1998) study the dynamics of sequential bargaining problems and show that both alternatives
yield equivalent results during adjustment processes if individuals are risk–neutral and the time preference rate
is identical for both players. Therefore, an asymmetric Nash bargaining problem can be used to characterise the
wage setting rule.
4 See e.g. Roth (1979) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for asymmetric Nash bargaining problems.
5 To see how the risk–adjusted present value of a ﬁlled job and the labour demand are linked note that the former
is given by (r+s)F, where F is the ﬁrm’s evaluation of a job (cf. appendix). One of the equilibrium conditionsPia Weiß 9
In the presence of time consuming search and matching processes, the equilibrium on the
labour market is determined by a situation in which the unemployment level remains constant.
Consequently, the number of matched individuals m has to equal the number of persons entering
the unemployment pool se, i.e. m(u;v) = se. Using the labour accounting condition n = e+u,








and is better known as the Beveridge curve. The Beveridge curve is negatively sloped and
convex to in the ¯ u=q–space. It can be seen in equation (9) that the labour market equilibrium is
independent of the chosen alternative to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts.
In contrast, the condition for the labour demand differs for the alternative ﬁnancial options.
The conditions for a lump–sum tax, a VAT, and an SSC are derived in the appendix. For a











Since the labour demand is independent of the unemployment rate ¯ u, it is a horizontal line in
the ¯ u=q–space. The condition determines the equilibrium number of vacancies per unemployed
person. From the Beveridge curve follows the equilibrium unemployment rate and, hence, the
equilibrium employment level.















The graph of this condition is negatively sloped and concave to the origin in ¯ u=q–space. Since
the value of (1¡ ¯ u)=(1¡(1¡b0)¯ u) is smaller than one, this graph lies entirely below the one
for a lump–sum tax. As the economy reaches full employment, i.e. as ¯ u reaches zero, the graph
approaches the one for a lump–sum tax. However, this point is not a feasible equilibrium, since
the equilibrium on the labour market is always characterised by a strictly positive number of
unemployed persons. With the unemployment rate approaching one, the Beveridge ratio, i.e. q,
reaches zero and the graph crosses the ¯ u–axis.
















1¡(1¡b0)¯ u¡rb0 ¯ u
y: (10)
The graph of the labour demand for an SSC is also negatively sloped and concave to the origin
in a q=¯ u–space. It lies below the appropriate graph for a lump–sum tax and approaches the
latter as full employment is reached, i.e. as ¯ u approaches zero. Again, full employment is not
a feasible equilibrium outcome. When the unemployment rate increases, the Beveridge ratio
state that there are offered as many vacancies until the expected return on a last posted vacancy qF equals its
costs g. Clearly, the higher the expected return on a vacancy the more job opportunities are offered.10 How to Finance Unemployment Beneﬁts
q







Figure 4.1: The equilibrium for alternative ﬁnancing options
approaches zero, i.e. q ! 0 for ¯ u < 1. Equation (10) shows that the graph coincides with the
one of a VAT, when the employer alone pays the contribution to the unemployment beneﬁts (a
payroll tax), i.e. if r = 0. In contrast, if workers pay at least part of the contribution to the SSS,
the graph for an SSC completely lies below the one for a VAT.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the equilibrium in an economy for the three alternative ﬁnancing op-
tions. The Beveridge curve labelled BC is represented by the downward sloped curve. The
superscripts ls,VAT, and SSC are used to distinguish the alternative labour demand curves LM.
In addition, the subscripts indicate the restriction under which the particular labour demand
curve is valid.
Figure 4.1 shows that introducing a VAT yields a lower employment level (a higher unem-
ployment rate ¯ u) and a lower Beveridge ratio (q) compared to a lump–sum tax. If an economy
with a lump–sum tax is regarded as reference point, imposing a VAT biases the employment
level. Since the graph of the labour demand curve for a pure payroll tax (r = 0) coincides with
that of a VAT, the same is valid for a payroll tax. The ﬁgure also reveals that the SSC, where
workers bear part of the contribution (r > 0), results in an even lower level of employment
and the Beveridge ratio. Both reach their lowest level for a pure income tax, i.e. for r = 1.
Accordingly, the employment level is also biased for an SSC.
To look for the reasons of the employment bias, it is useful to examine the wage sharing rule
(8). Rearranging equation (8), it can be written as
ce¡cu = bS
S = ce¡cu+ ppy¡wc+gq;
(11)
where S denotes the total surplus generated by the match. A wage satisfying equation (11)
leaves the potential employee with a share of the common surplus which is proportional to its
bargaining power. Accordingly, the employer receives
F = (1¡b)S; (12)Pia Weiß 11
where F is the ﬁrm’s evaluation of a job.
The equations specifying the employees and the unemployed person’s consumption level
(2), the ﬁrm’s instantaneous proﬁt from a ﬁlled job (20), and equation (21) are applied to replace





for a lump–sum tax. Similarly, with equations (6), (20), and (23), the common surplus for a








Since (1¡ ¯ u)=(1¡(1¡b0)¯ u) is smaller than one, the common surplus of a match is smaller
when a VAT as opposed to a lump–sum tax is introduced. As the common surplus of a match
determines the value of a ﬁlled job, according to equation (12) the ﬁrm’s evaluation of a job
F is lower when a VAT as compared to a lump–sum tax is used to ﬁnance the unemployment
beneﬁts. Hence, having a ﬁlled job is less proﬁtable when a VAT as opposed to a lump–sum tax
is introduced. As a consequence, fewer vacancies are introduced in the former situation. To see
this, note that as many vacancies are offered so that the expected return on the last one qF (cf.
appendix) equals the cost g of posting it. Since the return on a vacancy F is smaller when a VAT
instead of a lump–sum tax is imposed, q(q) needs to be higher in the former. The deﬁnition
of q(q) shows that fewer vacancies per unemployed person are offered when a VAT is levied.
In addition, the common surplus of a match becomes the smaller the higher the unemployment
rate in this case. As a consequence, ﬁrms ﬁnd it increasingly unproﬁtable to offer vacancies
when the unemployment rate rises. This can be seen in the graph LMVAT.
The same argument applies to a situation in which a pure payroll tax is introduced, i.e. an
SSC with r = 0. When a policymaker decides in favour of an SSC and the employees have to
bear part of the contribution (r > 0), an additional employment bias emerges.
We implicitly assumed that potential workers and potential employers behave rationally
during the wage bargaining (cf. appendix). In particular, this means that both partners will not
accept an offer generating a negative surplus. If a lump–sum tax is levied, the surplus of a match
to a potential worker in an equilibrium is given by ce¡cu = (1¡b0)w. The surplus is positive
and, hence, the individual is willing to accept a job at reasonable conditions if 1¡b0 > 0.
Since this condition is satisﬁed per deﬁnition, the worker is prepared to work even for a low
wage. Similarly, the ﬁrm’s surplus of a match is given by F = (ppy¡wc +g)=(r +s+q)
(cf. appendix). The employers will reject all wage offers inducing the total labour costs to
exceed ppy+g.6 Therefore, the employer is willing to hire a worker in an equilibrium if wc <
ppy+g. Summarising both conditions show that the bargaining partners will consent to a wage
or equivalently total labour costs from the interval wc 2 [0;ppy+g].
6 This condition implies that an entrepreneur is willing pay a higher wage than it he or she receives by selling the
products. This is indeed rational under the assumed circumstances, as the best alternative is to post the unﬁlled
job again when the negotiation breaks down in which case he receives zero revenues. In that situation, however,
the ﬁrm has to incur a cost of g. Paying a wage equal to ppy+g leaves him in exactly the same position as a
breakdown of the wage negotiation.12 How to Finance Unemployment Beneﬁts
Suppose now, an SSC is imposed. Then, the entrepreneur’s surplus of a match is still given
by F = (ppy¡wc)=(r+s+q). The employers will reject all wage offers inducing the total
labour costs to exceed ppy+g. The employee’s surplus of a match reads ce ¡cu = (1¡b0 ¡
rJ)w=pc. As it can be seen, the surplus is positive if the wage is positive and 1¡b0 > rJ. The
latter condition is identical to the one in an economy with a lump–sum tax or a VAT if r = 0,
i.e. if a payroll tax is raised, and is satisﬁed per deﬁnition. In this special case, the employment
level bias has proved to be the same as for a VAT. For the more general case of r > 0, the
condition differs from the one with a lump–sum tax or a VAT. In contrast to the condition with
a lump–sum tax or a VAT, the one with an SSC is not satisﬁed per deﬁnition. Rather, it imposes
an additional restriction on the economy. Clearly, 1¡b0 >rJ>0 is satisﬁed in an equilibrium.
However, the latter is compatible with only certain values of the contribution J determined
endogenously. If the condition is violated no individual will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to work. The fact
that the contribution J inﬂuences the surplus of a match introduces the additional employment
bias for r > 0.
One possibility of dealing with the additional bias is to change the structure of the SSC.
Suppose, thepolicymakerimposesthecontributiontotheSSSontheemployedandunemployed
person’s income. Then, the consumption and the indirect utility of a job seeker changes to
cu = (1¡rJ)b0w=pc. It follows that the common surplus of a match is now identical to that
for a VAT(cf. appendix). When the SSC is levied on both the employee’s and the unemployed
person’s income no additional restriction is imposed. This can be veriﬁed by noting the workers
share of the common surplus is positive if the wage, 1¡rJ, and 1¡b0 are positive. The
last two conditions are satisﬁed by deﬁnition. A recalculation of the model reveals that the
labour demand curve is independent of r and coincides with the one for a VAT (cf. appendix).
Accordingly, if the job seeker’s income is normally taxed, the employment level is identical to
that reached with VAT.
5 Welfare
As mentioned above, the policymaker only determines the revenue structure of the SSS. He
or she may introduce a VAT or an SSC. If the policymaker favours the latter he or she also de-
cides on the share which a ﬁrm and an employee has to bear. However, the policymaker cannot
inﬂuence the expenditure structure of the SSS and does not intervene into private decisions.
Firms decide whether they offer a vacancy and wages are the outcome of a bilateral negotiation
between workers and employers.
Suppose, the government desires a low unemployment rate and only has two alternatives
to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts — a VAT or an SSC. The last section has shown that the
policymakerisindifferentbetweenaVATandapayrolltax, i.e.anSSCwith r=0. However, he
or she prefers both ﬁnancing options to an SSC, where the workers bear part of the contribution.
Would a policymaker decide differently when he or she strives to maximise welfare?Pia Weiß 13
The appendix shows that the policymaker’s welfare function reads














Since introducing a payroll tax, i.e. an SSC with r = 0, as opposed to an SSC with r > 0
renders the lower unemployment rate and the higher Beveridge ratio q, the welfare is higher for
the former alternative. A comparison between a VAT and a payroll tax shows that both options
yield identical unemployment rates and Beveridge ratios so that the same welfare levels are
attained. As a consequence, the policymaker is indifferent between a VAT and a payroll tax,
but would not introduce an SSC, where a share of the contribution to the SSS is imposed on
the employee’s income but not on that of the unemployed individual. In contrast, if part of the
SSC is levied on the employed and unemployed individual’s income the policymaker is again
indifferent between introducing a VAT and an SSC.
6 Potential reforms
Before discussing potential reforms of an SSS’s revenue structure, the derived results are
summarised. First, a policymaker’s decision problem was considered consisting in choosing
between a VAT and an SSC to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts. However, the policymaker
was assumed to face several restrictions: I) In accordance to most OECD countries, the beneﬁts
were assumed to be a ﬁxed fraction of the previous earnings. II) The beneﬁts are not taxed. III)
The government has to run a balanced budget. Assuming that the government desires a high
welfare, it can be shown that:
² The government is indifferent between a VAT and a payroll tax, i.e. an SSC only imposed
on entrepreneurs.
² The policymaker favours a VAT or a payroll tax to an SSC imposed on both employees
and employers.
An application of this model can be seen in Japan. However as in Belgium, Denmark, Italy,
and Switzerland unemployed persons do not pay the SSC, the model may also represent these
countries (cf. table 1).
Second, the policymaker’s decision problem was reconsidered under a slightly different set
of restrictions. Number II) was replaced by the assumption that the beneﬁts are normally taxed.
Then, it can be demonstrated that the policymaker is indifferent between a VAT a payroll tax
or a ’normal’ SSC, where employees and employers share the contribution to the SSS. The
modiﬁed model is e.g. applicable to Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway, (cf. table 1).
Given a country imposes an SSC on employees and employers but not on unemployed per-
sons, the reform suggestions for the revenue structure of an SSS comprise two alternative ac-
tivities. (i) a change from direct to indirect taxation or (ii) changes within a direct taxation,14 How to Finance Unemployment Beneﬁts
i.e. a SSC where r 2 [0;1]. According to the ﬁrst possibility, the derived results in a matching
framework show that a policymaker may well shift from a SSC to a VAT since employment and
welfare increase by the change.
If the government is not prepared to change from direct to indirect taxation it can also
improve the employment level. The second option consists in equally taxing the employed
and unemployed person’s income. In particular, this means that if employees and employers
share the SSC the contribution should also be imposed on beneﬁts. However, this contradicts
the intention of an unemployment insurance, according to which workers insure themselves
against the risk of unemployment and, thus, the inevitable loss of income. Consequently, the
policymaker can transform the SSC shared by employers and employees into a payroll tax.
In this situation, the employer alone pays for the unemployment beneﬁts and the individual’s
income is not directly inﬂuenced. However the real earnings for workers and job seekers are
equally affected if the entrepreneurs pass part of the tax onto consumer prices. On the other
hand, the policymaker may change the SSC to the income tax levied equally on the incomes of
employed and unemployed persons.
The present analysis has neglected a number of aspects which may affect the results. First,
we did not consider the individual’s decision between working and leisure. A high direct tax,
whether in form of an income tax of a shared SSC, may discourage the search for a job. Second,
capitalplayednoeffectiveroleinthemodel. However, aVATbroadensthetaxbasebyincluding
capital income. Third, as a saving decision was not considered, the effects of the alternative
options to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts on investment were not studied. Finally, the
enforcement efﬁciency of the different taxes were not taken into account. As the tax evasion
seems more problematic for the income related taxes, a VAT appears even more preferable.
Appendix
The sharing rule
The sharing rule which a wage has to satisfy as derived here is the solution of an asymmetric
Nash bargaining problem. Therefore, the expected returns for individuals and ﬁrms have to
be determined. A general formulation is chosen here so that the sharing rule is valid for a
lump–sum tax, a VAT, and an SSC. Since a person can be employed or unemployed, dynamic
programming speciﬁes the return on being one or the other, respectively. Similarly, each ﬁrm
has exactly one job to be either ﬁlled or unﬁlled. Hence, there is a return on a ﬁlled and vacant
job respectively.
A worker’s return on being employed E has to satisfy
rE = ce+s(U ¡E); (13)
where U stands for a job seeker’s return on being unemployed. rE is a worker’s permanent
income that has to equal the sum of the indirect utility for an employee ce and the ’gain’ from
changing the employment status occurring with probability s. This formulation implicitly as-
sumes the existence of a perfect capital market with an interest rate r.Pia Weiß 15
By analogy, the job seeker’s return on being unemployed can be determined by
rU = cu+ p(E ¡U): (14)
Again, the permanent income of an unemployed person depends on the indirect utility of an
unemployed person cu. The interpretation of this equation is similar to the one above.
The return on a ﬁlled job F is given by
rF = ppy¡wc+s(V ¡F); (15)
whereV is the return on a vacancy. The equation states that the permanent income from a ﬁlled
job rF has to equal the sum of the immediate return ppy¡wc (the proﬁt obtained from the job)
and the expected loss from the destruction of the employee–employer pair s(V ¡F).
Finally, the return on a vacant job V has to satisfy
rV = ¡g+q(F ¡V); (16)
where g denotes the cost of keeping the vacancy.
In an equilibrium, the expected net return on an additionally offered vacancy has to be zero
if there are no difﬁculties in generating these. Hence, the condition V = 0 has to be satisﬁed.
Using this fact in equation (15) results in
qF = g (17)
stating that the expected return on a vacancy qF equals the cost of offering the vacancy g. This
equation implicitly determines the number of vacancies offered in an equilibrium and, hence,
also the labour demand.
The solution of an asymmetric bargaining process will maximise the Nash product W =
[E¡U]b[F ¡V]1¡b, where b denotes the bargaining power of an individual. Differentiating the
Nash product with respect to the wage and using the result that V = 0 in an equilibrium yields
the ﬁrst–order condition for the wage negotiation:
E ¡U = bS
S = E ¡U +F:
(18)
S denotes the common surplus of the match. Then, the ﬁrst–order condition of the Nash bar-
gaining problem states that the individual’s surplus of the match (E¡U) equals the share of the
common surplus equivalent to their bargaining power. Accordingly, the employer’s share F of
the common surplus is given by
F = (1¡b)S:
The value functions (13) and (14) can be used to solve for the individual’s surplus: E¡U =
(ce¡cu)=(r+s+ p). By analogy, using equation (15) and (17) to solve for F ¡V and noting
that the value of a vacancy is zero in an equilibrium ensues the ﬁrm’s surplus of the match,
F =(ppy¡wc+gq)=(r+s+p). Thelattertwoconditionscanbeusedtoreplacetheappropriate
value function in the sharing rule (18). The general formulation of the sharing rule reads
(1¡b)(ce¡cu) = b(ppy¡wc+gq):16 How to Finance Unemployment Beneﬁts
The labour demand curve
The labour demand curve for a lump–sum tax, a VAT, and an SSC is derived from four
equations: the product market equilibrium, the sharing rule, an equation for the instantaneous
proﬁts and the government’s budget restriction. The sharing rule is given by equation (8) and
the government’s budget constraints by equations (2), (4), and (6). To specify the labour de-
mand condition for each ﬁnancing option, the product market equilibrium and the instantaneous
proﬁts have to be determined in a general form ﬁrst.
The product market equilibrium equates supply and demand for the single consumer good.
The employed and unemployed individuals disposable incomes differ so that they will realise
dissimilar consumption levels. The demand is ece+ucu. Since each ﬁrm can hire exactly one
worker, the number of active ﬁrms equals the number employed persons. Hence, the supply is
given by ey. It follows that the product market equilibrium reads in a general form
ece+ucu = ey: (19)
Rearranging equation (15) and noting thatV = 0 in an equilibrium yields (r+s)F = (ppy¡
wc). Inserting (17) into the latter expression leads to
r+s
q(q)
g = ppy¡wc: (20)
The equation states that the risk–adjusted present value of a ﬁlled job to a ﬁrm (left–hand side)
equals the instantaneous proﬁts from that job (right–hand side).
The labour demand for a lump–sum tax
Using the employed and unemployed person’s consumption for a lump–sum tax (2) in the
product market equilibrium condition (19) ensues in ew+b0wu¡nl = ey. According to the
government’s budget constraint (3) second term on the left–hand side equals the third term so
that
w = y: (21)
Equations (2) and (20) can be used to replace the consumption levels for employed (ce) and
unemployed persons (cu) from equation and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts (ppy¡wc) in the wage sharing











The left–hand side is the equilibrium expression for the effective risk–adjusted present value
of a ﬁlled job to a ﬁrm (r+s+ p)F. We refer to this expression as labour demand since it
determines the latter implicitly.Pia Weiß 17
The labour demand for a VAT
Again, we commence by deriving the real wage for an economy with a VAT. Replacing








The identities ¯ u = u=n and e=n = 1¡ ¯ u were used in addition.
Equations (4) and (20) can be used in the sharing rule to derive (1¡b)(1¡b0)w=pc =
bg(q+(r+s)=q). Inserting the real wage (23) into the latter expression gives the labour demand














The labour demand for an SSC
Employing the employed and unemployed person’s consumption speciﬁed in equation (6),
the product market equilibrium condition can be written as (e(1¡rJ)+b0u)w=pc = ey. With







Inserting equation (6) and (20) into the sharing rule (8) gives (1¡b)(1¡b0¡rJ)w=pc =
bg(q+(r+s)=q). ThecontributionJandtherealwagecanbeeliminatedinthelatterexpression

















The common surplus of a match when unemployed persons pay the SSC
When the beneﬁts are subject to the SSC the unemployed person’s consumption and indi-
rect utility is given by cu = (1¡rJ)b=pc. Using this equation together with the employee’s
consumption in the product market equilibrium (19) yields (e+b0u)(1¡rJ)w=pc = ey. Re-








On the other hand, the common surplus of a match is deﬁned as S = ce ¡cu + pp ¡wc +
gq. The instantaneous proﬁts pp ¡wc are still given by equation (20). Inserting (20) and the
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which is identical to Sva.
The labour demand for an alternative SSC
Utilising equation (4) with the alternative speciﬁcation for the unemployed person’s con-
sumption level cu = (1¡rJ)b=pc and the equation for the instantaneous proﬁts (20) in the


























The labour demand under the alternative setting of an SSC is identical to the one under a VAT.
The welfare function
Let W denote the welfare comprising the individuals and ﬁrms equilibrium utility. rE and
rU are the equilibrium utilities of an employed and unemployed person respectively. Similarly,
rF and rV are the equilibrium utilities of a ﬁrm having a ﬁlled job and a vacancy respectively.
As each entrepreneur can only hire one worker, there are e employees and e active ﬁrms in the
economy. The welfare function can be written as
W = erE +urU +erF +vrV
Using the equations (13) and (14), it follows that
erE +urU = ece+ucu = ey;
where the last identity follows from the product market equilibrium. Noting that V = 0 if each
ﬁrm offers the optimal number of vacancies in an equilibrium, the welfare function becomes







The derivatives of the welfare function with respect to the unemployment rate and the Beveridge












= ¡n(1¡ ¯ u)rg
q0
q2 > 0:Pia Weiß 19
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